What is MTS in the USSR? procedure for providing collective farms with equipment. How Khrushchev sentenced a Russian village

In 1958, Khrushchev decided to liquidate MTS and sold the equipment to collective farms. Socialism was curtailed in the countryside, and the country faced a real threat of famine

MACHINE AND TRACTOR STATIONS (MTS)

MACHINE AND TRACTOR STATIONS (MTS), large state-owned consistently socialist-type enterprises in the agriculture of the USSR, equipped with modern machinery - tractors, combines and other agricultural products. machines and equipment created by the Soviet state as strongholds in the socialist reconstruction of the village. farming and providing assistance to collective farms in organizing and managing their farms on a modern technical basis and scientific basis. The Soviet state, with the help of the MTS, exercises its leadership role in relation to collective farms, combining its leadership, organizational, production and technical assistance with the initiative of collective farmers in the comprehensive development of public farming and the organizational and economic strengthening of collective farms.

Comrade Stalin in his brilliant work “Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR” (1952, p. 90) wrote:

"...the concentration of the main instruments of agricultural production in the hands of the state, in the hands of machine and tractor stations, is the only means of ensuring high rates of growth of collective farm production."

The construction of the MTS is an integral part of the Lenin-Stalin plan for building socialism in our country, carried out by the Soviet people under the leadership of I.V. Stalin.

The importance of machinery and the role of MTS in the socialist transformation of agriculture. In his famous cooperative plan for involving the peasantry in the cause of building socialism, V. I. Lenin pointed to the decisive role of the technical re-equipment of the village. x-va, providing a base of modern machinery for it.

“The victory of socialism over capitalism, the consolidation of socialism,” wrote V.I. Lenin in 1920, “can be considered assured only when the proletarian state power, having finally suppressed all resistance of the exploiters and ensured perfect stability and complete subordination, reorganizes all industry on the basis of large-scale collective production and the latest (based on the electrification of the entire economy) technical base. Only this will make it possible for such radical assistance, technical and social, provided by the city to the backward and scattered villages, so that this assistance will create the material basis for a huge increase in the productivity of agriculture and agriculture in general labor, thereby encouraging small farmers by the force of example and for their own benefit to move to large-scale, collective, machine farming" (Oc., vol. 31, p. 138).

To successfully transfer a village to the socialist path of development, Lenin taught, it must be supplied with tractors and machines, and comprehensive assistance from the socialist state is necessary. Lenin pointed out that only the massive use of tractors and machines in agriculture, electrification on a mass scale, can solve the issue of socialist re-education of small farmers.

"... so that small and minute peasant farms are gradually, but steadily, not by way of pressure, but by way of demonstration and persuasion, united into large farms on the basis of public, comradely, collective cultivation of the land, with the use of agricultural machines and tractors, with the use of scientific methods of agricultural intensification.

There are no other exits" (Oc., vol. 10, pp. 305 - 06).

Comrade Stalin taught that in order to ensure the victory of socialism in the countryside, it is necessary to carry out a radical reorganization of both the productive forces and production relations, that without the unification of peasant farms into collective farms there is no way to seriously advance either the intensification or mechanization of agriculture. farms, just as it is impossible to develop collective farms without rebuilding the technical base of the villages. farms, without supplying it with modern agricultural products. cars.

But it is impossible to supply the villages with tractors and machines without developing socialist industry at an accelerated pace. The rapid pace of industrial development was, according to the teachings of Lenin and Stalin, the key to the reconstruction of the village. x-va. Pursuing a policy of industrialization, the Communist Party and the Soviet state in an exceptionally short time created a powerful tractor-building industry and ensured the production of modern agricultural products in our country on an unprecedented scale. machines (see Agricultural mechanical engineering). Based on the successes in the industrial development of the country, the Communist Party, under the leadership of Comrade Stalin, organized a wide supply of the countryside with advanced machinery - tractors and agricultural equipment. machines, launched mass training of mechanization personnel capable of using this technology, all this creating new productive forces in the countryside, strengthening the production link between city and countryside and facilitating the transition of the peasantry to the path of building collective farms

Summarizing the experience of socialist construction in the countryside, J.V. Stalin “...revealed the importance of MTS as strongholds in the socialist reorganization of agriculture and the provision of assistance to agriculture and the peasantry by the socialist state” (Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin Brief biography, p. 134). In a speech at the April (1929) Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, outlining the party’s tasks in the rearmament of the village. farming on the basis of new technology and the construction of collective agriculture, Comrade Stalin justified the need

“...to develop a system of machine and tractor stations that will help the peasantry master new technology and collectivize labor...” (Works, vol. 12, p. 58).

This was a major scientific discovery - the discovery of a new, previously unprecedented in the world, form of large enterprises in the village. x-ve, designed to be a powerful lever of the Soviet state in the creation and strengthening of collective socialist production in the village. x-ve, a tool for restructuring the entire way of rural life, a means of communist education of millions of working peasants.

“That during the transition to a communist economy we will have to use cooperative production on a large scale as an intermediate link—Marx and I never doubted this. But the matter must be arranged in such a way that society—and therefore, for the first time, the state—retains ownership of the means of production and, thus, the private interests of the cooperative partnership could not prevail over the interests of society as a whole" (Marx and Engels, Works, vol. XXVII, p. 524).

V.I. Lenin further developed this most important principle of socialism. construction in the village. J.V. Stalin, having discovered the MTS as a form of organization of large agricultural enterprises by the Soviet state. enterprises concentrating advanced machine technology and providing collective farmers with production and other assistance, thereby making an invaluable contribution to the treasury of Marxist-Leninist agrarian theory, taking a new step in the development of the teachings of Marx-Engels-Lenin about the victory of socialism in the countryside.

In his programmatic work “Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR,” Comrade Stalin revealed the deep fallacy of proposals to sell machine and tractor stations to collective farms. In this classic work, Comrade Stalin showed that the progressive progress of our socialist agriculture, obtaining large harvests and achieving agricultural abundance. products are unthinkable without improving technology, without replacing old equipment with new ones, and new ones with the latest. But collective farms are not able to bear the billions of dollars in equipment upgrading costs.

These expenses, which can only be recouped in 6-8 years, can only be borne by the state.

“What does it mean after all this to demand the sale of MTS to the collective farms? This means,” Comrade Stalin pointed out, “to drive the collective farms into great losses and ruin, to undermine the mechanization of agriculture, to reduce the rate of collective farm production” (Economic problems of socialism in the USSR, 1952, pp. 91).

Sale of basic agricultural implements to collective farms. production, Comrade Stalin wrote, could only distance collective farm property from public property, expand the sphere of commodity circulation and would not lead to a closer approach to communism, but, on the contrary, to a distance from it, would slow down our progress towards communism.

The long history of the development of MTS, their greatest role in the creation and strengthening of the collective farm system and in the continuous development of the productive forces of socialist agriculture of the USSR, as well as the successful use of this form by people's democracies that have firmly embarked on the path of building a socialist economy, convincingly confirm the historical significance and deep vitality The form of organization of large mechanized social services discovered by Comrade Stalin. agriculture.

“...in the person of MTS,” the resolution says, “a form of organization by the Soviet state of large-scale collective agriculture on a high technical basis, which most fully combines the initiative of the collective farm masses in the construction of their collective farms with organizational and technical with the help and leadership of the proletarian state" (Pravda newspaper, December 30, 1930).

V. Abramov, M. Gritskov

Literature: Engels F. [Letter] - A. Bebel, January 20 [-23], 1886, in the book: Marx K. and Engels F., Works, vol. XXVII, [M.], 1935, p. 521 - 26; Lenin V., Works, 4th ed., vol. 29 ["Report on the work in the countryside on March 23 at the VIII Congress of the RCP (b)"], vol. 31 ("Initial draft of theses on the agrarian question"); Stalin I., Works, vol. 10 ["Political report of the Central Committee to the XV Congress of the CPSU (b)", vol. 12 ("Political report of the Central Committee to the XVI Congress of the CPSU (b)", "The year of the great turning point", "On the right deviation in the CPSU(b)", "On issues of agrarian policy in the USSR"], his own, Speech at a meeting of advanced combine operators and combine operators with members of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) and the Government on December 1, 1935, [M.], 1947; his, Economic problems of socialism in the USSR, [M.], 1952; Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. Brief biography, 3rd ed., M., 1952; Directives of the 19th Party Congress on the fifth five-year development plan of the USSR for 1951 - 1955, [M .], 1952; Malekkov G., Report to the XIX Party Congress on the work of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, [M.], 1952; On measures to boost agriculture in the post-war period [Resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. February 1947] , [M.], 1947; Standard agreement between a machine and tractor station and a collective farm, approved by the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of December 19, 1949, and a standard agreement thereto.

Sources:

Agricultural Encyclopedia. T. 3 (L - P) / Ed. board: P. P. Lobanov (chief editor) [and others]. Third edition, revised - M., State Publishing House of Agricultural Literature, 1953, p. 613

Counter-revolutionary reforms of the Menshevik Khrushchev

MACHINE AND TRACTOR STATIONS (MTS)

Comrade Stalin in his brilliant work “Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR” (1952, p. 90) wrote: “. concentration of the main instruments of agricultural production in the hands of the state, in the hands of machine and tractor stations, is the only means of ensuring high rates of growth of collective farm production.”

The construction of the MTS is an integral part of the Lenin-Stalin plan for building socialism in our country, carried out by the Soviet people under the leadership of I.V. Stalin.

“The victory of socialism over capitalism, the consolidation of socialism,” wrote V.I. Lenin in 1920, “can be considered assured only when the proletarian state power, having finally suppressed all resistance of the exploiters and ensured perfect stability and complete subordination, reorganizes all industry on the basis of large-scale collective production and the latest (based on the electrification of the entire economy) technical base. Only this will make it possible for such radical assistance, technical and social, to be provided by the city to the backward and scattered villages, so that this assistance will create the material basis for a huge increase in the productivity of agricultural and agricultural labor in general, thereby inducing small farmers by the force of example and for their own benefit to move to large-scale, collective, machine farming" (Works, vol. 31, p. 138).

Comrade Stalin, developing Lenin's ideas about socialist construction in the countryside under the Soviet system, developed a holistic theory of collectivization of the village. x-va. Comrade Stalin emphasized the decisive role of machinery in the socialist reorganization of the small peasant village. In his report to the XV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, justifying the need for a transition to collective farming, Comrade Stalin indicated that the solution was “. so that small and minute peasant farms are gradually, but steadily, not by way of pressure, but by way of demonstration and persuasion, united into large farms on the basis of social, comradely, collective cultivation of the land, with the use of agricultural machines and tractors, with the use of scientific methods of intensifying agriculture .

There are no other exits” (Oc., vol. 10, pp. 305 - 06).

But it is impossible to supply the villages with tractors and machines without developing socialist industry at an accelerated pace. The rapid pace of industrial development was, according to the teachings of Lenin and Stalin, the key to the reconstruction of the village. x-va. Pursuing a policy of industrialization, the Communist Party and the Soviet state in an exceptionally short time created a powerful tractor-building industry and ensured the production of modern agricultural products in our country on an unprecedented scale. machines (see Agricultural mechanical engineering). Based on the successes in the industrial development of the country, the Communist Party, under the leadership of Comrade Stalin, organized a widespread supply of the countryside with advanced machinery - tractors and agricultural equipment. machines, launched mass training of mechanization personnel capable of using this technology, all this creating new productive forces in the countryside, strengthening the production link between city and countryside and facilitating the transition of the peasantry to the path of building collective farms

Summarizing the experience of socialist construction in the countryside, J.V. Stalin “. revealed the importance of MTS as strongholds in the socialist reorganization of agriculture and the provision of assistance to agriculture and the peasantry by the socialist state” (Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin Brief biography, p. 134). In a speech at the April (1929) Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, outlining the party’s tasks in the rearmament of the village. farming on the basis of new technology and the construction of collective agriculture, Comrade Stalin justified the need “. develop a system of machine and tractor stations to help the peasantry master new technology and collectivize labor. "(Works, vol. 12, p. 58). This was a major scientific discovery - the discovery of a new, previously unprecedented in the world, form of large enterprises in the village. x-ve, designed to be a powerful lever of the Soviet state in the creation and strengthening of collective socialist production in the village. x-ve, a tool for restructuring the entire way of rural life, a means of communist education of millions of working peasants.

The founders of scientific communism, Marx and Engels, while developing the principles of the socialist reorganization of small-scale production in the countryside after the victory of the socialist revolution, emphasized the need to preserve the leadership of cooperative construction with the proletariat, and to prevent the interests of cooperative associations from prevailing over the interests of society as a whole. In a letter to Bebel (1886), Engels wrote: “That during the transition to a communist economy we will have to widely use cooperative production as an intermediate link—Marx and I never doubted this. But the matter must be arranged in such a way that society - therefore, at first, the state - retains ownership of the means of production and, thus, the private interests of the cooperative partnership cannot prevail over the interests of society as a whole" (Marx and Engels, Op. ., vol. XXVII, p. 524).

These expenses, which can only be recouped in 6-8 years, can only be borne by the state.

“What does it mean after all this to demand the sale of MTS to collective farms? This means,” Comrade Stalin pointed out, “to drive the collective farms into great losses and ruin, to undermine the mechanization of agriculture, and to reduce the rate of collective farm production” (Economic problems of socialism in the USSR, 1952, p. 91). Sale of basic agricultural implements to collective farms. production, Comrade Stalin wrote, could only distance collective farm property from public property, expand the sphere of commodity circulation and would not lead to a closer approach to communism, but, on the contrary, to a distance from it, would slow down our progress towards communism.

On December 29, 1930, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in its resolution “On the production program of the Tractor Center for 1931,” clearly defined the essence of machine-tractor stations: “. in the person of MTS, - the resolution says, - a form of organization by the Soviet state of large-scale collective agriculture on a high technical basis was identified and tested on mass experience, which most fully combines the initiative of the collective farm masses in the construction of their collective farms with organizational and technical assistance and the leadership of the proletarian state" (Pravda newspaper, December 30, 1930).

V. Abramov, M. Gritskov

Literature: Engels F. [Letter] - A. Bebel, January 20 [-23], 1886, in the book: Marx K. and Engels F., Works, vol. XXVII, [M.], 1935, p. 521 - 26; Lenin V., Works, 4th ed., vol. 29 [“Report on work in the countryside on March 23 at the VIII Congress of the RCP (b)”], vol. 31 (“Initial draft of theses on the agrarian question”); Stalin I., Works, vol. 10 [“Political report of the Central Committee to the XV Congress of the CPSU(b)”], vol. 12 (“Political report of the Central Committee to the XVI Congress of the CPSU(b)”, “The year of the great turning point”, “On the right deviation in the CPSU(b)”, “On issues of agrarian policy in the USSR”], his own, Speech at a meeting of advanced combine operators and combine operators with members of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) and the Government on December 1, 1935, [M.], 1947; his, Economic problems of socialism in the USSR, [M.], 1952; Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. Brief biography, 3rd ed., M., 1952; Directives of the 19th Party Congress on the fifth five-year development plan of the USSR for 1951 - 1955, [M .], 1952; Malekkov G., Report to the XIX Party Congress on the work of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, [M.], 1952; On measures to boost agriculture in the post-war period [Resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. February 1947] , [M.], 1947; Standard agreement between a machine and tractor station and a collective farm, approved by the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of December 19, 1949, and a standard agreement thereto.

Agricultural Encyclopedia. T. 3 (L - P) / Ed. board: P. P. Lobanov (chief editor) [and others]. Third edition, revised - M., State Publishing House of Agricultural Literature, 1953, p. 613

How Khrushchev sentenced a Russian village

Today, an article was posted on the website of the Military Review portal, which talks about the damage to the agriculture of the USSR caused by Khrushchev’s experiments. The author begins with the fact that the Russian village has always been the basis of the economy, “the reproduction of the Russian superethnos, its spiritual health.” If the state is unable to provide itself with its own food, it is forced to import it, “paying for them with gold and its own resources, which are necessary for the development of the country.” And in the context of the emerging global geopolitical confrontation, food insecurity can lead to catastrophic consequences.

The following lists the actions of N.S. Khrushchev, which led to the disorganization of agricultural production. The author recalled that at the end of the Stalin era and in the first years after his death, there was a successful development of agriculture. However, the liquidation of state machine and tractor stations (MTS) led to painful consequences.

After all, MTS were “state enterprises on a contractual basis with agricultural collective farms.” Their main function was production and technical services for agricultural producers. The fact is that most collective and state farms did not have sufficient funds necessary to purchase complex agricultural equipment, ensure their uninterrupted operation and train personnel. At the first stage, there was a shortage of equipment, which predetermined the need for its centralized distribution. Under the current circumstances, “the concentration of large agricultural machinery in the MTS gave ... a great economic gain.”

The abolition of the MTS and the order to collective farms to buy back agricultural equipment (high prices were set for it) resulted in negative consequences. “The collective farms had to spend all the savings that remained from 1954-1956 to buy back equipment, which worsened their financial situation. Also, collective farms did not have the funds to immediately create an appropriate base for storing and servicing equipment. In addition, they did not have the appropriate technical specialists. Nor could they attract former MTS workers en masse. The state could afford to pay workers at machine and tractor stations higher wages than collective farms. Therefore, most workers began to look for more profitable niches and found other uses for themselves. As a result, many machines quickly turned into scrap without proper maintenance. Total losses. This was a strong blow to the economic potential of the Soviet countryside.”

The matter was not limited to the liquidation of MTS. Khrushchev launched a campaign to consolidate state and collective farms. As a result, their number decreased from 83 thousand to 45 thousand. In addition, Nikita Khrushchev launched a campaign to consolidate collective and state farms. Their number was reduced from 83 thousand to 45 thousand. In a word, N.S. Khrushchev planned to “implement his old project to create “agricultural cities”.” The result of this practice was the formation of gigantic unmanaged farms, which included “dozens of villages.” There was a degeneration of the leadership of “agricultural cities” into a food and sales “mafia”, dictating its terms to the authorities, including supply volumes and price levels. Ultimately, these associations actually got the opportunity to sell products in city markets at inflated prices.

The implementation of the project to create agricultural cities required large capital investments, which the collective farms did not have (they “spent their last funds on buying out equipment”). As a result, this idea failed. Thus, by the mid-1980s, more than 60% of state farms created in the 1960-1970s in the Non-Black Earth Region turned out to be unprofitable.

The pricing policy was also detrimental. “The state established the minimum purchase prices for agricultural products specifically in the Non-Black Earth Region of the RSFSR. This policy was pursued from the end of the 1950s until the end of the USSR. As a result, the national republics of Transcaucasia and Central Asia received an additional channel of incentives and monetary support.”

Another Khrushchev action that dealt a blow to agriculture was the policy of eliminating “unpromising” villages, which began in 1958. Suddenly, thousands of thriving villages in the USSR were declared unprofitable and quickly abolished. The authorities issued orders to search for “unpromising” villages. The article rightly notes that these steps are quite comparable with the modern practice of the so-called. “reformers” whose policy is aimed at “resettling residents from small villages to large ones and concentrating the bulk of the population, production and social facilities in them.” All this is carried out under the banner of “optimization” of rural clinics, educational institutions, etc.

The abolition of “unpromising” villages was carried out in a directive manner, without taking into account the wishes of the village residents themselves. Getting a village on the “black” list meant the cessation of any construction there, the closure of shops, schools, clubs, and the elimination of bus routes. The overwhelming majority of people moved not to “settled areas designated for them,” but “to regional centers, cities, and other regions of the country.” As a result, active desolation of villages and hamlets was observed. Thus, the number of rural settlements in Siberia from 1959 to 1979 decreased by 2 times (from 31 thousand to 15 thousand). The number of small villages and “the entire settlement network” has decreased significantly.

The article emphasizes that a similar policy is being pursued at the present time. The cessation of capital construction, the “consolidation” of schools, the reduction of medical institutions, bus routes, and the movement of commuter trains - all these are the harsh realities of today.

As for the results of this experiment, they were disappointing. “Across the Urals, Siberia and the Far East for 1959-1989. the number of villages decreased by 2.2 times (from 72.8 thousand to 32.6 thousand). In most cases, this policy had a negative impact on the entire socio-economic development of the village and the country as a whole. The country suffered serious demographic damage. The concentration process led to a decrease in the population level of the territories. The thinning of the network of populated areas in the eastern regions weakened and disrupted inter-settlement connections and had a negative impact on services to the population. The village was losing one of its main functions - spatial development. The village was losing its most active, young people, many of whom left their small homeland forever. There were also negative moral consequences. A significant part of the population was marginalized; people lost their roots and the meaning of life. It was not for nothing that village people were then considered less spoiled by the vices of urban civilization. The destroyed village began to “sink” and drink itself to death. The morbidity and mortality rate of the rural population in “unpromising” regions has increased sharply.

There was a sharp social deterioration in relations between the city and the countryside. The policy led to severe overpopulation of cities, since migrants preferred to migrate not to the settlements designated for them, but to regional centers and cities. This led to a constant fall in the price of labor, as well as skilled labor in industry and extractive industries. Of course, this often led to conflicts with the townspeople, not to mention the so-called “sausage landings” of villagers in the cities.”

Thus, the sabotage nature of this campaign is obvious. It was not in vain that the Russian writer Vasily Belov assessed it as “a crime against the peasants.” Particularly affected were the “indigenous Russian regions of the Non-Black Earth Region, as well as the Russian rural population of Siberia.”

The policy of eliminating “unpromising villages” dealt a blow to the food security of the USSR. Thus, during the Stalin period, food was exported, and from the late 1960s, the import of agricultural products from the countries of the socialist community began. Things got to the point that in the 1970s, articles were published “about the inexpediency of growing sugar beets in Russia (!) in view of the “guaranteed supply of raw cane sugar from fraternal Cuba.” “By the mid-1980s, the share of Eastern European and Cuban imports in supplying the cities of the RSFSR with meat (including poultry), sugar and fruits and vegetables exceeded 70%, and villages reached 60%. It was a shame and a disaster."

The author writes that the loss of food security in our country is a direct result of the policies of Khrushchev and “his followers, including modern Russian liberals.” The so-called course “liberal reforms” completely finished off the Russian village. In our stores we see products imported from different parts of the planet.

The final part of the article notes that Khrushchev’s “transformations,” on the one hand, were chaotic, on the other, completely systemic. The essence of the system was destruction. These experiments led to the collapse of the USSR and the socialist system as a whole.

The above material allows us to assert that all the problems that the agriculture of the USSR faced during the Khrushchev-Brezhnev period were associated neither with the collectivization of the 1930s, nor with the existence of collective farms as such, as the ideologists of the capitalist class claim. Indeed, in the pre-war period there were colossal economic, technical, technological and social successes in Soviet agriculture. As noted in the article, in the early 1950s there was a noticeable trend towards improving production indicators in the agro-industrial complex. The whole point is precisely in Khrushchev’s voluntaristic experiments, expressed in the abolition of the MTS, in the creation of agricultural cities, in the curtailment of individual subsidiary farming, in the predatory pricing policy, in the abolition of “unpromising villages.” However, all this cannot be compared with the result of the liberal “reforms” of the 1990s, which led to the complete collapse of agricultural production. At least by the mid-1980s, the import level was 26%, and, for example, in 2008, it reached 46% (and this was during a period of relative “stabilization.” And during the disaster of the 1990s, this figure was significantly higher).

The opposite example was demonstrated by countries such as China and Belarus. Thus, in the PRC, both individual farms, cooperatives, and collective associations operate in parallel. The authorities of Belarus did not destroy the collective farm-state farm system, but improved it by allowing the functioning of alternative methods of farming in rural areas as an alternative to large collective farms. The positive outcome of this policy is obvious. Consequently, it was not a matter of the collective farm system.

As for Khrushchev’s actions, which damaged agricultural production and the Russian countryside as a whole (and in the long term led to the collapse of the USSR and the socialist system), we should not forget that in the 1920s he openly voted for Trotskyist platforms. And the Trotskyists (as well as the Bukharinites) were counter-revolutionaries who opposed the building of socialism in our country and for the restoration of capitalism. We have written many times before about their Russophobic sentiments, about unification with Nazi Germany and Japan in the 1930s in the name of the fight against Soviet power. Thus, we were talking about revenge of the counter-revolution defeated in 1937-1938. No wonder N.S. Khrushchev, during his speech at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956, actually rehabilitated them, declaring that they were not spies and saboteurs. However, the result of the practice of their historical successors is obvious.

Liquidation of machine-tractor stations with

Khrushchev hoped to implement his agrarian program and the slogan put forward in 1957 - “Catch up and overtake the USA!” - using administrative-command methods: intensifying party and state activities.

Reorganization of MTS. By decision of the February Plenum of the Central Committee in 1958, a reorganization of collective farms and machine and tractor stations was carried out. MTS equipment was sold to collective farms, and MTS workers joined the collective farm peasantry.

By the way, this measure was proposed by some economists during a 1951 discussion on the political economy of socialism, but Stalin rejected it, saying that in this case we would ruin the collective farms. Indeed, collective farms were forced to purchase equipment at their own expense, and they repaired it at their own expense, because state repair and technical stations were created on the basis of MTS. Only they were allocated spare parts. The purchase and repair of equipment placed an additional financial burden on collective farms.

Liquidation of subsidiary farms. August 20, 1958 By a resolution of the Bureau of the Central Committee for the RSFSR, workers of state farms and residents of cities and urban-type settlements were prohibited from keeping livestock on their private farms. At the same time, vegetable gardens were cut back and crops were taken away. The expectation that this would create a new incentive for the development of the public economy did not come true, but there was a turning point in the minds of rural residents: it turned out that they could get up 2 hours later, without knowing weekends and vacations, not serve livestock, not mow, do not cultivate your gardens after a hard day of work, do not prepare hay and food for the winter.

The villager became easy-going, and after the liquidation of the “unpromising villages” he moved not to the central estate, where he was promised increased comfort, but immediately rushed to the city, where the pay was higher, the conditions were better, and most importantly, the social status was much greater. higher. Sometimes in the villages of the Central Non-Black Earth Region there were only old women left (old people, as a rule, became drunkards and died earlier).

Other equally “valuable” initiatives: expansion of bean crops, “chemicalization of the entire national economy” also gave a temporary effect, but then the difficulties grew like an avalanche. Agriculture remained the most backward sector of the USSR economy.

"Ryazan disaster". A clear example of the catastrophic consequences of adherence to voluntaristic methods of coercion associated with the “chase of records” was the “Ryazan disaster.” The impetus for it was a speech delivered on May 22, 1957 in Leningrad, in which Khrushchev proposed tripling meat production in the country in three years. The first year and a half brought a very modest increase (8%), which caused extreme irritation for Khrushchev, who was faced with the need to admit that his project was in fact impossible.

At the end of 1958, instructions were sent to regional party committees to take “decisive measures” to increase meat production in 1959.

Methods for solving the livestock problem were clearly demonstrated by the first secretary of the Ryazan Regional Committee of the CPSU A.N. Larionov. In 1958, he reported that the region had exceeded the plan for procurement of livestock products by 2 times, and in 1959 he promised to exceed the plan by 3.8 times!

The promises, despite their unreality, were approved by the regional party conference and on January 9, 1959, on the urgent recommendation of Khrushchev and contrary to the opinion of the Agricultural Department of the CPSU Central Committee, published in Pravda. Several other areas responded to the “challenge.”

The Ryazan region had not yet begun to implement its grandiose program when awards began pouring in. In February 1959, she received the Order of Lenin, and Larionov himself became a Hero of Socialist Labor a few months later.

To keep the promise, the regional party committee ordered the slaughter of all the offspring of 1959, as well as most of the dairy herd and producers, “added” against receipt all the cattle raised by collective farmers on their farms. However, even these measures were not enough, and therefore the purchase of livestock was organized in neighboring regions using funds from public funds intended for the purchase of cars, the construction of schools, etc. The “meat tax” hit not only all collective and state farms in the region, but also all city institutions; meat sold to the state (at purely symbolic prices) disappeared from sale.

On December 16, 1959, local authorities solemnly reported that the plan was 100% fulfilled: the region “sold” 150 thousand tons of meat to the state, tripling the previous year’s supply; the obligations for 1960 were taken even higher - 180 thousand tons!

However, in 1960, the procurements turned out to be 6 times less than promised; they did not exceed 30 thousand tons. After the mass slaughter of the previous year, the livestock decreased by 65% compared to 1958. Collective farmers, whose livestock was “temporarily” confiscated against receipt, refused to cultivate the collective farm lands, which led to a drop in grain production by 50%. By the end of 1960, it became impossible to hide the disaster, and the “hero of socialist labor” Larionov committed suicide.

The golden stars of Heroes shone on the jackets of other regional committee secretaries, including those who previously could not boast of success in agriculture. The mechanism of these successes was simple: collective farmers and state farm workers were forced to hand over all their livestock for meat, the missing ones were purchased in neighboring regions; Instead of milk, they donated butter bought in stores; They did not disdain outright deception. For example, cattle were registered as handed over to the state, but were left on farms “for foster care” so that they would gain weight, and then they would be handed over a second time!

The use of “Ryazan methods”, more or less cartoonishly widespread in many regions, led to disastrous results: in 1964, meat production was inferior to the level of 1958. All this dealt a serious blow to Khrushchev’s prestige; slogan “Catch up and overtake America!” soon firmly migrated into jokes. The subject of jokes was also Khrushchev’s passion for corn, with the help of which he hoped to solve the feed problem.

Economic consequences of the 1958 "initiatives" From an economic point of view, 1958 appears to be the milestone after which the Khrushchev project, carried out since 1953, went downhill.

In industry 1958-1964 marked:

— a significant increase in capital investment and rapid growth of loans exceeding the capabilities of the state budget;

- sharp and uncontrolled growth of industry producing means of production;

— an unexpected massive influx of low-skilled labor from rural areas, which increased staff turnover, which was never overcome by the law against “flyers” adopted in 1960;

— a defensible decline in economic growth rates;

— an increase in the deficit associated with a decrease in the intensity of development of the production of consumer goods.

In agriculture, there was also a decrease in growth rates (agricultural production increased by an average of 1.5% per year in the period 1959-1964 versus 7.6% in 1953-1958; the same - 3% versus 9% – also occurred in relation to the growth of labor productivity). In 1959-1964. Average annual grain production per capita barely exceeded 1913 levels.

The course for the “expanded construction of communism.” However, “Nikita” (as Khrushchev was popularly called) did not let up. In January 1959, at the extraordinary XXI Congress of the CPSU, he announced that socialism had won completely and finally in the USSR.

Meanwhile, it was clear to the management from classified information that the VI Five-Year Plan for 1956-1960. will not be executed. In order to disguise this failure, it was decided, before the completion of the VI five-year plan, to adopt a new seven-year plan, adding the last years of the VI five-year plan to the new, “seven-year” plan (1959-1965). The socialist competition announced in connection with the congress gave rise to the movement of “communist brigades” under the slogan “Live, work and study like a communist.”

Reorganization of economic management(economic councils). Lacking serious knowledge, Khrushchev saw the cause of all shortcomings solely in poor leadership. Hence the continuous reorganizations based on the principle of Krylov’s fable “Quartet”: “How can the music go, because you’re not sitting like that!” Back in June 1955, the Plenum of the Central Committee adopted a resolution on technical progress and industrial organization. It was decided to develop specialization of production in combination with cooperation, to bring the processing of raw materials closer to the places of their extraction.

At the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party, held on February 13-14, 1957, Khrushchev outlined his project for decentralizing the economy by abandoning sectoral management of industry and construction and replacing it with the territorial principle of management - the creation of economic councils. On May 10, 1957, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, at the suggestion of Khrushchev, voted for the creation of economic councils and the liquidation of 10 industrial ministries. On May 22, 1957, in Leningrad, he gave an important speech, which marked the beginning of the voluntarist policy of “throwing forward” (“Catch up and overtake the USA!”), accompanied by further decentralization.

Instead of numerous ministries, councils of the national economy of economic regions were created: the North-West, the Industrial Center, the Chernozem Center, the Volga-Vyatka region, the Middle and Lower Volga region, the Urals, Western and Eastern Siberia, the Far East, Transcaucasia and Central Asia.

In total, 70 economic councils were created in the RSFSR, 11 in Ukraine, 9 in Kazakhstan, and 4 in Uzbekistan. The remaining republics, Moscow and the Moscow region had their own economic councils. This facilitated local cooperation, but led to a departure from a unified technical policy and broke cooperation ties on a national scale. Therefore, it was necessary to create the All-Union and Republican Economic Councils, and then state committees for industries. The result was not a decrease, but an increase in the bureaucracy and an expansion of command-administrative methods of economic management.

The economic councils played a certain role in the development of industry locally, but made it extremely difficult to manage it on a national scale. The large number of economic councils also created difficulties.

In November 1962, at the Plenum of the Central Committee, Khrushchev initiated a number of changes in the organization of economic planning and management, which went against the previous policy of decentralization. The number of regional economic councils was reduced from 94 to 47 (more than half), and their activities were to be controlled by the USSR Economic Council. Somewhat later, in March 1963, the reconstruction of the centralized structure was completed with the formation of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, placed above all economic management bodies, including Gosplan, Gosstroy and other state committees, replacing the ministries abolished in 1957.

The November 1962 Plenum also carried out an important party reform, proposed by Khrushchev in September 1962. This reform changed the structure of the party, dividing it in two: one half had to deal with industry, the other with agriculture.

At the same time, on Khrushchev’s initiative, the Bureau of the Central Committee for the RSFSR, Transcaucasia and Central Asia was formed to manage industry and construction, agriculture, light and chemical industries. Previously, unified regional party organizations were divided into industrial and rural regional committees; instead of district committees, cluster and territorial-production party committees were created.

If earlier the workers of the party apparatus were fenced off from business executives, now business executives, as a rule, were nominated for party work, and party workers for economic work: for example, an agronomist or collective farm foreman, an engineer, a shop manager were elected secretaries of party organizations, then they were promoted to the positions of directors, from there to secretaries of district and regional committees, etc. right up to the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee.

As a result, party workers increasingly interfered in the direct management of the economy, interfering with business executives, and abandoned work with people. Political, party-organizational and ideological work was replaced by economic work, its skills were lost, which was later reflected with the beginning of “perestroika”.

System of party-state control. Khrushchev tried to compensate for the inevitable deterioration in the functioning of the national economy by strengthening control. In November 1962, the Plenum of the Central Committee formed a system of party-state control bodies, which received enormous power. The chairman of party control was the former (in 1952-1958) First Secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, and then (in 1958-1961) chairman of the State Security Committee - Alexander Nikolaevich Shelepin (“Iron Shurik”, as his colleagues called him).

In 1962, he simultaneously became chairman of the Party and State Control Committee of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. In these capacities, he could call, as officials said, “on the carpet” any minister.

Shelepin Alexander Nikolaevich (b. 1918), sov. state, part. activist From 1940 at Komsomol work, from 1943 secret, in 1952-58 1st secret. Central Committee of the Komsomol. In 1958-61 before. KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. In 1961-67 sec. Central Committee of the CPSU. in 1962-65 before. K-ta party-state. control of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, deputy. prev SM USSR. In 1967-75 before. All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. In 1975-84 on other state. work. Member Central Committee of the CPSU in 1952-76, member. Pres. Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee in 1964-75. Dep. USSR Armed Forces in 1954-79.

Regional, city and district committees had the right to make cash settlements, impose fines on business leaders and express no confidence in them, which meant the threat of removal from office, transfer of the case to the court and the prosecutor's office.

Constant reorganizations, ill-conceived innovations, and personnel transfers produced a short-term effect that quickly faded. Not possessing scientific knowledge and not appreciating science, N.S. Khrushchev interfered in everything and gave “valuable guidelines” on all issues. But his energy was directed at top-level transformations of governing structures, without affecting the economic foundations of society.

The results of Khrushchev’s economic “innovations”. Thus, 1957-1959. were marked by a series of administrative reforms and "campaigns" designed to improve the functioning of the economic system. An important place among them was occupied by: the creation of economic councils, the liquidation of MTS, the consolidation of collective farms, the campaign against private plots, and voluntaristic methods of increasing meat production (“Ryazan disaster”). All this ultimately led to the economic crisis of 1962-1963.

The 1963 harvest was especially bad, which was largely a consequence of the “fallow elimination campaign” undertaken in 1962, which turned the drought of 1963 into a real disaster. Intensive monoculture exploitation of virgin lands led to their severe erosion, as a result of which the efficiency of their cultivation fell by 65% compared to the first harvests. To avoid famine, the government was forced to purchase more than 12 million tons of grain abroad, which cost $1 billion.

large state agricultural enterprises, the technical base of collective farms, one of the levers of state management of collective farm production.

The first MTS was founded in 1928 in the Be-re-zovsky district of the Odessa district on the basis of the tractor column of the state farm named after T G. Shev-chen-ko. Massive organization of MTS, established since 1929 in the period of pro-ve-de-niya number of lek-ti-vi-za -tion (statutory STO dated 06/05/1929), was considered by the authorities as the main means of raising she-niya pro-iz-vo-di-tel-no-sti labor in the land-le-de-lia and de-mon-st-ra-tion of the advantages of collective ho-ho -farms in front of the individual.

First of all, MTS is a joint-stock company, headed by the All-Union Center for Machine-Shin-but- tractor stations (“Trak-to-ro-center”, 1929-1932), in 1932 they were transformed into state enterprises, ru- The leadership of MTS was transferred to the People's Commissariat of the USSR. To work in MTS, the city workers from among the party members and committee members were the right ones. In 1933-1934 (and in 1942-1943) under the MTS there was action from the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), in which the position of deputy together with the OGPU, who had equal rights with the heads of the district GPU (OGPU order No. 0017 dated January 25, 1933), their responsibility is to include agent-tour-oper-a-tiv work among per-so-na-la MTS and rural residents. Politically-de-ly, ideological, political and punitive measures are used to ensure to ensure that the plans of the collective farms are not fulfilled and to “cleanse” the collective farms and MTS from the “class of enemies” elements.

Initially, the MTS staff included only the workers of their ap-pa-ra-ta and the service worker -cash, me-ha-ni-for-the-ry, in their own way, were collective farms, didn’t have op-la-chi-vae- washed-off releases, sick-sheets, assistance with the same work-ability. In 1935, the MTS staff re-re-ve-de-ny com-bay-ne-ry and ma-shi-ni-sty mo-lo-ti-lok (os-tal-nye me-ha-ni-za -to-ry - in 1953). The mutuality of the MTS and the collective farms were built on the basis of the do-go-thief and the obligatory character . The volume of me-ha-ni-zi-rovannyh work was op-re-de-lyal not for the number of farms, but for the possible ma- tire-but-truck-tor-no-go steam-ka MTS.

The work of MTS op-la-chi-va-la-kol-ho-za-mi per-in-on-chal-but at hard-smoky money prices, since 1933 -de-na op-la-ta na-tu-roy as a percentage of the biological harvest of agricultural crops (was higher than am-bar-no-go). In 1938, the transfer of MTS to the full state budget was carried out, one of the go-su-dar-st-vo-lu-cha-lo from the number -ho-call to the op-la-tu of their ras-go-dov on the MTS 20% of the grain harvest, ku-ku-ru-zy, under-sol-nech-ni-ka, cotton and flax, 17% - beets and 16% - potatoes. In 1954, the tour-op-la-ta MTS began to count on hard-smoke rates - for every type of work, while teaching This is an am-bar, not a biological harvest.

Since the second half of the 1930s, MTS served the overwhelming majority of collective farms in the USSR (sovkhozes had their own technical Nika). They lived mainly in the agricultural regions of the center, south and south-east of the country. In 1937, in the RSFSR there were 67.7% of the country's MTS, in the Ukrainian SSR - 16.5%, in the Kazakh SSR - 4.9%, in the Belarusian SSR - 3.4%, in the Uzbek SSR - 2.8%, in the Azerbaijani Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Georgian, Tajik SSR - 0.9-0.8% each, in the Armenian SSR - 0.4%. In the RSFSR, 15.1% of MTS were located in the Central Black Sea region, 13.6% in the North Caucasus and the Crimea. mu, 13.4% - in the Middle and Lower Volga, 12.7% - in the Urals, 7.7% - in Western Siberia, 5.5% - in Eastern Siberia -bi-ri, 3.2% - in the European North and 2.5% - in the Far East.

In accordance with the decision of the ple-nu-ma of the Central Committee of the CPSU (September 1953), MTS is responsible for the responsibility at a time -view of all sides of the collective farm production - from planning to accounting and distribution of information -from-ve-den-production (in connection with this, in paradise-is-pol-ko-mah there are agricultural departments) . On the balance of MTS there are re-da-ny control-but-seeds and ag-ro-chemical la-bo-ra-to-rii, ve-te-ri-nar-nye teaching points and points. In 1954-1957, according to the type of project, work began to be built in the villages of MTS, which had electricity supply and -to-pro-water, repair-workshops, administrative buildings, residential buildings, cultural-tour-objects-but-would-be-on- meaning.

In 1958, the leadership of the USSR made a decision on the sale of agricultural technology to the collective farms and on the pre-production of research of parts of MTS into repair and maintenance stations (USSR Law “On the further development of the collective farm system and re-or-ga- ni-za-tion of machine-tire-but-tractor-stations" dated March 31, 1958), which led to the actual launch of MTS. This decision mo-ti-vi-ro-va-la is that in the own-st-ven-no-sti the collective farm-call of tech-niki will be used more effective. The sale of agricultural technology was carried out in a mandatory order, at an accelerated pace (by the end of 1958, -moose 345 MTS) and at high prices, the overwhelming majority of businesses were unable to pay for it, ok -elk is in debt and lacks working capital. About 1/2 of the money you would have transferred to city enterprises.

In the mid-1990s, the price of the use of technology in the form of car tires began to rise -technological stations for servicing created on the basis of collective farms and state-owned joint-stock farms, etc. .societies, farmers and personal sub-farms.

Collective farms are served by state machine and tractor stations, in which the most important implements of agricultural production are concentrated.

The concentration of the most important means of agricultural production in the hands of the state is an enormous advantage of the collective farm system.

Agricultural technology is constantly being improved. Without this, the forward progress of socialist agriculture is unthinkable. The creation of numerous increasingly advanced machines requires large capital investments that pay off over a number of years. The Soviet state invests significant and ever-increasing funds in agriculture, which would be beyond the power of individual, even the largest agricultural enterprises.

In 1953 alone, expenditures on the development of agriculture from the state budget, as well as from other public funds, amounted to 52 billion rubles. In 1954, these costs increased to 74.4 billion rubles. As part of the budget allocations, expenses for further strengthening of machine and tractor stations amount to 30.8 billion rubles.

Machine and tractor stations represent the industrial material and technical base of collective farm production and are the decisive force in the development of collective farm production, the most important strongholds in the management of collective farms by the socialist state. Through MTS the production link between industry and agriculture is realized. The relationship between machine and tractor stations and collective farms expresses socialist production relations between the working class and the collective farm peasantry.

Thanks to MTS, the development of collective farms takes place on the basis of higher technology. A high level of mechanization of collective farm production is the basis for increasing labor productivity on collective farms. Mechanization greatly facilitated the work of collective farmers and opened up the opportunity to carry out agricultural work in accordance with the rules of agronomy and to apply the achievements of advanced agricultural technology. The widespread use of MTS machines in collective farm production provides great savings in labor costs for the production of agricultural products.

By the beginning of 1953, machine and tractor stations had 80% of the total power of mechanical engines (including electric) located in MTS and collective farms. In 1953, MTS carried out over 80% of the main field work on collective farms, including almost all plowing. The work performed by the MTS in 1953 with the help of tractors and combines required 21.9 million fewer annual workers than would have been required to perform the same work on individual peasant farms.

At the beginning of their activity, machine and tractor stations served mainly the grain farming of collective farms. Then they gradually began to cover all aspects of collective farm production: the cultivation of industrial crops, livestock raising and its feed base, potato growing and vegetable growing. An extensive network of specialized machine and tractor stations has been created in relation to the production direction of collective farms in certain regions of the country.

“The main task of machine and tractor stations is to comprehensively increase the productivity of all agricultural crops on collective farms, ensure the growth of the public livestock population while simultaneously increasing its productivity, and increase the gross and marketable output of agriculture and livestock farming on the collective farms served”1.

1 “On measures for the further development of agriculture of the USSR.” Resolution of the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, adopted on September 7, 1953 based on the report of comrade. Khrushcheva N. S., “The CPSU in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences and plenums of the Central Committee,” part II, ed. 7, 1953, p. 1182.

The most important condition for solving this problem is the completion of comprehensive mechanization of all branches of collective farm production: grain farming, production of industrial and feed crops, potato and vegetable growing, as well as labor-intensive work on collective farm livestock farms. Socialist industry is able to provide agriculture with any agricultural machines of the most advanced designs. In machine-tractor and specialized stations, qualified mechanical personnel of permanent workers have been created: tractor drivers, foremen of tractor teams, combine operators, and drivers of other complex agricultural machines. This makes it possible to make the most complete and productive use of rich and complex agricultural machinery.

Machine and tractor stations, as large state-owned industrial enterprises serving collective farms, are called upon to be conductors of a high culture of agriculture and organizers of collective farm production. The Soviet state, through machine and tractor stations, exercises its leading role in the organizational and economic strengthening of collective farms. MTS provide agronomic and zootechnical services to collective farms, assist them in planning the public economy, in the proper organization of labor, in training personnel, and in the entire economic, political and cultural life of the Soviet village. This requires qualified leadership, the ability to manage a farm based on the achievements of modern agronomic and zootechnical science, generalization and implementation of the experience of the leaders of socialist agriculture into production.

To solve these problems, MTS has management, engineering and technical personnel with higher education, highly qualified agricultural specialists - agronomists and livestock specialists who constantly work on collective farms.

Until 1953, the rich and complex equipment available in the MTS was entrusted to seasonal collective farm workers, who were allocated by the collective farms to work in the MTS only for the duration of field work. In accordance with the decisions of the September Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee (1953), permanent mechanization personnel were created in machine and tractor stations: about 1 million 250 thousand permanent workers were enrolled in the MTS staff, including 870 thousand tractor drivers, 187 thousand foremen of tractor brigades and their assistants, 24 thousand drivers of complex agricultural machines. To train agricultural machine operators, a network of mechanization schools similar to factory training has been organized. More than 100 thousand agronomists and livestock specialists were sent to MTS to service collective farms.

Machine and tractor stations serve collective farms on the basis of agreements concluded with them, which have the force of law for both parties. The main economic indicator of MTS activity is that the collective farms served by this MTS receive the largest amount of products and cash income for every 100 hectares of agricultural land.

In accordance with the agreements concluded by MTS with collective farms, collective farms pay for work performed for them by machine and tractor stations in kind - agricultural products, and for some work - in money. Payment in kind for MTS work is part of the gross output of the collective farm, reimbursing the costs of state machine and tractor stations for the production of collective farm products. Payment in kind embodies past labor, consisting of the spent means of production of MTS, as well as the newly expended labor of MTS workers, consisting of labor for themselves and labor for society. Rates of payment in kind for the work of machine and tractor stations are fixed, differentiated by zones of the country depending on their economic and natural conditions. For exceeding crop yield plans, MTS receive bonuses in kind from collective farms - a certain part of the above-plan harvest.

By selling agricultural products received from collective farms and as payment in kind, the state receives funds that are spent on reimbursing the costs of means of production of MTS and the wages of MTS workers. Through the sale of agricultural products received as payment in kind, the state also receives net income, which is used to expand existing ones, build new ones, and for other national needs.

The establishment of fixed rates of payment in kind created economic conditions for the transition of MTS from budget financing to economic accounting so that each machine and tractor station made its expenses depending on the income received. A further rise in collective farm production requires a serious improvement in the functioning of the machine and machine systems and a more complete and efficient use of machinery.

The principle of workers' material interest in the results of their labor is implemented in MTS in special forms, different from the forms of remuneration in other state enterprises and collective farms. Permanent and seasonal workers of tractor teams receive wages for their work in cash and in kind on the basis of piecework. At the same time, during field work, wages are calculated according to the fulfilled production standards and prices in workdays. The state, through machine and tractor stations, pays permanent and seasonal workers of tractor brigades a guarantee minimum in cash and in kind (grain), the amount of which depends on the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the planned target for agricultural yields on the collective farms served.

In addition, the workers of tractor teams, for the workday they work, receive from the collective farm in which the MTS tractor team works, the difference between the actual distribution of grain per workday and the guaranteed minimum, as well as all other agricultural products on an equal basis with collective farmers. During off-field work (in repair shops, mechanization of livestock farms, construction work in MTS), machine and tractor stations pay their workers cash wages at piece rates. In addition to the wages received from the state, MTS agronomists and livestock specialists are awarded workdays in the amount of 10-20% of the number of workdays accrued to the chairman of a given collective farm for the year when fulfilling established plans for crop yields and livestock productivity. In addition to official salaries, MTS management employees receive cash bonuses for fulfilling and exceeding production plans and plans for delivering payments in kind to the state.

The system of remuneration for MTS workers financially interests them in the better use of agricultural machinery and in the rise of collective farm production.

Machine and tractor station

Machine and tractor station(MTS) is a state agricultural enterprise that in the USSR and a number of other socialist states provided technical and organizational assistance with agricultural machinery to large producers of agricultural products (collective farms, state farms, agricultural cooperatives).

They played a significant role in organizing collective farms and creating their material and technical base. In the year - abolished. MTS carried out maintenance and repair of tractors, combines and other agricultural equipment and leased it to collective farms.

Story

in USSR

The first tractor units appeared in the late 1920s. The first MTS is considered to be the Shevchenko MTS, organized in 1927 (then Steppe District, present-day Odessa region of Ukraine). On June 5, 1929, the Council of Labor and Defense adopted a resolution on the widespread creation of MTS. This solution made it possible to maintain a high level of equipment maintenance and gave collective farms the benefits of mechanization without the need for capital investments. MTS played an important role in the process of collectivization.

In the USSR, MTS existed until -1959; subsequently, agricultural equipment was transferred directly to collective farms. Then they were transformed into repair and technical stations, and subsequently into branches of Rosselkhoztekhnika.

in other countries

Modernity

Currently, due to the difficult financial situation of many agricultural enterprises, as well as the development of small farms, the need for machine and tractor stations has arisen again. As a result, a number of firms and companies involved in the supply of agricultural machinery began to offer farms seasonal rental services for agricultural machinery, primarily expensive combines.

Notes

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